Interviewed by: Erol AVDOVIĆ World-famous writer, born in Sarajevo, Aleksandar Hemon, also the most awarded American writer from the Balkans, has been living and working in Chicago since 1992. In a very open interview, exclusively for "Avaz," Hemon fiercely talks about the "craziness" of the Trump administration, Obama's legacy, and the political responsibility of the Clintons, whose role is "overestimated" in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
He also refers to the frequent mention of Bosnia, Srebrenica, and Sarajevo in the UN when talking about regional war hotspots. Although he is too busy (he teaches at two universities), on the eve of his trip to Paris and in Europe, he took the time to talk about the moral challenges of the world for our paper. For "Avaz," he reveals what four books he is currently writing.
Attaching an emblem Regarding the planetary suffering of Syrian Aleppo, Hemon says it was expected that politicians and diplomats, such as the American ambassador Samantha Power, would attach an "emblem" of Bosnian suffering to it. But, as he says, the best evidence of everything is the people who personally survived the Bosnian inferno, because "for them, Bosnia is not an abstraction." We are witnessing that Libya and Syria are often compared to Bosnia. Hillary Clinton compared Benghazi to Srebrenica and Samantha Power to Aleppo. Does it help to end the suffering, or is it just the familiar diplomatic rhetoric? - In addition to everything, there is also a problem with simplification, because all this complexity of suffering needs to be attached to some sign or some emblem that will be understandable without special explanations. That's the way the media works, especially in the West, given the scant attention paid to the rest of the world. To that extent, it is understandable and can be expected. On the other hand, the whole situation with Syria and Aleppo is so different than it was in Bosnia. There is a similarity, of course, because it is a war that produces destruction and millions of refugees, but the similarity is only there if you look from the outside and from afar. Those comparisons are applicable only as part of that media discourse, but they have no special value. Are we then talking about superficial and even hasty comparisons between Syria and Bosnia? - Well, I remember when a nice man, an American, when there was a war in Kosovo (1999) and when Milosevic tried to clean up Kosovo, asked me, "Will it end quickly or do I have to understand it?" All those long years of hatred and some platitudes with which the operation was carried out needed to be explained, so he, seeing me and knowing me, knew that there were some differences and asked me about it. There is, therefore, that certain ceiling of understanding, so the emblem of suffering can be attached to it. Neither Sarajevo nor Bosnia was easy to understand, but they became one sign and a common field of experience. The people of Srebrenica who survived the genocide, such as the well-known Adisada Dudić, a lawyer in Washington, are not very happy about the use of that "emblem" of suffering and the comparison of Aleppo with Srebrenica. It reminds them of personal suffering. How to explain or justify these comparisons behind their backs to the real victims? - It is quite natural that people who have experienced something like that, directly or indirectly, get on their nerves and that the abstraction of that experience bothers them. There is a problem. For those who live outside of that experience, to be able to understand what it looks like, that certain amount of abstraction is necessary, like laziness in knowledge. And for those who were in Srebrenica or in Bosnia or were connected to all of that, abstraction is the distortion of that experience, the simplification and elimination of the complexity of that entire experience. We from Bosnia and the entire area know that there is a line that separates those who still live within that experience and those who live outside of it. This is where communication difficulties arise. When Adisada explains to someone what happened in Bosnia, as we all explained, it is impossible to explain it completely. Because, for people who have experienced it on their bodies, on their family, and their loved ones, it can never be an abstraction. To these others, abstraction is inevitable. I write because I think it's one of those things, so art and literature—I can cross that line and communicate across it. And that's hard. I think that the human mind, especially in these times, tends to simplify the human experience to consume and avoid difficulties. You stayed here at the UN and wrote a book about that world organization; you studied the sluggishness of the UN administration, which even after 70 resolutions on Bosnia, after the failure in Rwanda, still does not manage to overcome the division of world diplomacy regarding Syria. How? - Yes, the book has been written and should be published next year; its publication is constantly delayed. My book is not an explanation of the UN but a travelogue related to my stay there and my experience in New York. What I learned and understood, although it was not known to me earlier, is that the influence of the UN depends on the Security Council (SC), in which the five permanent members (USA, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China) have the greatest influence. The UN is being accused of inefficiency while that inefficiency arises from the SC because each of the five permanent members can veto at any time. Only the SC has executive powers because their decisions, theoretically, must be carried out by all other members. However, if this execution is dodged, there are no major consequences. And when the General Assembly, i.e., 193 UN member countries, makes a decision, that resolution is not legally binding for the membership. In this context, the picture of the UN is complicated because in the Security Council, apart from five permanent, 10 countries—non-permanent members rotate every two years—and they try to somehow influence the making of executive decisions. However, the five permanent members play their political games inside and outside the UN, so the image of the United Nations as something that "does not depend" on the pressures of the permanent five, great powers, and countries that have power is completely illusory. Other countries have to pander to the powers of the great powers in any way they can. Morality first This is where, especially after our Bosnian experience, the constant question—what is the UN good for? - I think that the value of the UN is so important because, without the United Nations, everything would be much worse. The UN is an arena, a space in which the world as a unique category is imaginable. Without the UN, it would be much more difficult. Bearing in mind this unreformed Security Council and this organization of the work of the UN, it is impossible to achieve the efficiency that everyone wants and to do what many expect the UN to do. Just like the Dayton Constitution, the UN can't function effectively due to these limitations. In the UN, they refer to moral categories and mention Srebrenica or Rwanda, and the lessons seem not to have been learned yet. Cynics would question whether it even makes sense to appeal to morality in these harsh realpolitik circumstances. - Of course, there is. And of course, it should be done. I think that this is made possible by the fact that the UN, regardless of all organizational, structural, or bureaucratic problems, if they are already conceptually gathering humanity in one place, then the moral problem of humanity should be discussed in that space. It is the best, in fact, the only space where representatives of humanity can look each other in the eye over difficult moral issues. If there was no UN, where would it be done? In the columns of a newspaper that no one reads? It would be completely impossible. Whatever and how many restrictions there are in the Security Council, the representative of Rwanda can sit there, among those rotating members, and ask, say, the French ambassador—why? If there was no UN as an arena where the entire humanity gathers, what would be the space in which the moral responsibility of humanity could be discussed at all? The UN, therefore, must deal with it as an organization and as a conceptual space. But then why does the UN, as in the case of Bosnia, fail and even experience a debacle over and over again when it comes to Syria? How to defend morality in the future? - Yes, we know that these moral issues and demands will face the pragmatism of international politics and the games of permanent and non-permanent members in the Security Council, but that is why this moral space is hard to imagine without the United Nations. When we have already convinced ourselves that shame is not a very valid category in international politics, is it right that Samantha Power put the question to Vitaly Churkin, the Russian ambassador to the UN, "Do you have any shame at all?" about Aleppo? And along the way, she referred to Srebrenica. - I think it is correct, all the more so because the UN is a stage where such questions simply have to be asked. If she hadn't asked that question there, where would she have asked it? Surely not at a press conference when two state delegations meet. What is the outcome and what are the consequences of that question is a completely different story. So, there are these structural, political, and pragmatic limitations, but that's why (in the UN) one can imagine the existence of humanity in one place. Is invoicing that issue even imperative? - Well, I don't know if we can talk about the "imperative," because Samantha has already done it. And it's good that she did—better than not. Power once wrote that "American foreign policy is an immoral enterprise." You wrote in one story that anyone who works for the State Department is somehow morally inferior; you wrote "asshole." What do you think about it today? - That's a sentence from the story. That's what my character says. Those people (who work for the state administration, op. a.) have complex moral urges and motivations. And on the other hand, there is also the issue of layered responsibility. We all have a personal responsibility towards the world, and as members of organizations and as citizens, we have another layer of responsibility. So if I, as an honest man who has never done anything bad or harmed anyone, represent a state that is "criminal," then it is a morally complicated situation. Of course, I don't think that the USA is a criminal state. A complex moral situation applies to representatives of any state. I think that one of the reasons why the language of diplomacy is so devoid of poetry, and I described this in the book about the UN, is precisely to level the moral field, so that I wanted something to come out, like what Samantha said to Churkin's eyes. Thus, in communication, mostly phrases and words are used that are devoid of moral dimension. It seems that Power will represent the Trump administration at the UN for several months (if he does not resign on January 20), although he does not have many points of contact with the new president. How do you look at it? - In America, there is a tradition of peaceful transfer of power. It is hard to believe that Samantha Power will be a future civil servant. She has accepted the assumptions based on which the American state infrastructure or machinery functions, and it is hard to think that she would now be ready to send it all "to hell." I suspect, though, that there will be some moves to protect what Obama did from Trump and the insanity of his administration. What can be protected will be protected; it will probably happen under the grain as well. Oil interests Trump proposed the head of "Exxon Mobil," Rex Tillerson, who does not even have a day of diplomatic experience, as secretary of state. Is there any room for fear? - Of course, there is. Rex Tillerson represents the oil industry before he represents American democracy, and he will make decisions in favor of capitalist operations rather than decisions in favor of American democracy. That's the common thread in all of Trump's operations so far. What does Trump's coming to power even mean? - First, I think that Trump was elected as a punishment and not as someone who has some vision of society or some utopian voice, just as the ultraconservatives have their utopia, according to which they would ban abortion, homosexuality, etc., and everyone would have guns. As, for example, Senator Ted Cruz (Cruz) says. No. Trump operates on the level of self-interest and his psychopathological impulses. So he was elected to destroy things—to destroy some moral, ethical, ideological, and social-state frameworks. Indeed, it is not entirely clear to me what impulse guided his voters. But there will likely be a fight within the administration to protect something (from Obama's legacy, op. a.). Republicans and Trump agree on one thing: we need to dismantle, as much as possible, the structure of society, which limits the version of the greedy capitalist system that Trump and those who support him believe in. What does it mean when capitalism is equated with democracy, as Francis Fukuyama, celebrated in the West, says in the book of the same name that "the end of history" will culminate in the victory of that type of democracy? - One of the things with the American social order is that there has always been a tension between capitalism and democracy. Since the Civil War and then after the Great Depression of 1929 and World War II, there has been an axiomatic belief that democracy and capitalism are the same thing. And that the market of ideas is impossible without the market of goods. And then the regulation of the market limits the exchange of ideas... I think that with Bush (George W. Bush), this tension between American capitalism and democracy intensified so that we came to a situation of conflict. Trump is an expression of that. He is also proof that in this struggle between democracy and capitalism, the Republicans finally chose capitalism. Possible conflicts Is Trump's future cabinet a mirror of that lost battle for democracy? Well, all those he chose are either capitalists (Wall Street) or generals. So, these are those who have no interest or experience and benefit from democratic operations. So, this conflict between democracy and capitalism will continue and intensify, probably to the level of an armed conflict. Internal conflict or what? Well, I don't know what kind. But there will be conflicts, and someone will get hurt in all of this. As a writer, I'm in the process of imagining a screenplay, but I haven't finished it yet. Does this mean that Trump is more dangerous than Bush? Well, Trump would be impossible without Bush. It is known how the invasion and the war in Iraq were organized and how they then profited from it. We should not forget about the machinery of eavesdropping and population control. Compared to Bush and Trump, Obama was great, but on the other hand, Obama continued some of those oppressive strategies. He did not dismantle the operating models that Bush, Cheney (former US Vice President, Dick Cheney), and others established in the CIA, NSA (National Security Agency), or FBI, nor the way American capitalism works. It was too ambitious to expect that from Obama. And now Trump has inherited it. He now has in his hands the most powerful state operational (population) control structure in history.
How to define Obama's legacy? Some cynically argue that his greatest achievement is that he has stayed alive at all in a political landscape in which the US military-industrial complex pulls the most important strings. - I don't think Obama was ever in danger from the military industry or from Wall Street, because he got along well with them. Obama was elected because he was considered a better possibility (alternative) than both Trump and Bush and because America, which is so diverse ethnically, racially, and intellectually, is a tapestry of humanity. Such a society was more possible because of Obama's election, not Bush and, now, Trump. That is why Obama's value is more symbolic than a legacy. Frankly speaking, except for the first two years (of his presidency since 2008, op. a.), when he had a Democratic majority in Congress, everything else, when the Republicans established a numerical superiority—the entire Republican strategy was to undermine him in everything. He had a lot of trouble getting fundamental things through Congress. Obama, however, made a catastrophic mistake, perhaps out of some noble impulse, because he wanted to be the president of all Americans: after the first two years when the Democrats had control of Congress, he did not aggressively break up the Republican Party. So, when Bush lost, when the Republican wing was weakened and in disarray, as is the situation with the Democrats today, Obama did not do that, even though there was no new (Republican) ideological framework. I believe that, in football, when your team leads 5:0, then you should go to 10 zero. Of course, Obama also knew that no American president could ever do two things—the financial industry and the military industry—so he didn't either. American democracy works just fine if a president is elected who won't screw it up.
How much did the Clintons contribute to the breakdown of the Democratic Party from within and to Trump's victory in general? - They contributed, but we cannot blame the victim for the violence. It is primarily about the political responsibility of the Clintons and their party. I have been in America for 25 years, and my first president and first election campaign were related to Bill Clinton. I remember very well and became aware very quickly that the Clintons systematically destroyed the left in the Democratic Party and formulated a policy of triangulation. This is because they can always count on the votes of trade unions, the working class, minorities, the LGBT population, etc., so they don't have to pander to them. That's why the Clintons started running after what they thought was the center-right—back then the phrase "soccer mom" was used for that (middle-class women, mothers who take their children to soccer, op. a.), therefore, middle-class whites, because they are the ones who decide the elections. The Democratic Party began to move toward that imagined center. Then Clinton began to make many disgusting compromises, such as reforming the welfare system. The Clintons were much more in tune with Wall Street than, say, Jimmy Carter. So they built the Democratic Party, in which the left was eliminated. From that void came Bernie Sanders (Bernie). Did Sanders even have a chance with Trump and Hillary Clinton like this? I doubt it. Maybe here and there it would be difficult. But the fact that Bernie Sanders is the only socialist in Congress, and there hasn't been anyone else since 1972, speaks for itself. From the left, they were the only ones who failed to eliminate Sanders. There are no new leftists or leaders anymore. There are no new politicians from that camp either, except for this one—the most stubborn, although he is almost insignificant, comes from Vermont and has done nothing in Congress. He was the only one who showed up in the last elections, and that left that supported him is a completely new generation, which does not remember how it was before Clinton.
How do you see America in the foreseeable future during the reign of the Trump administration? - I see no way out. There will be a fight that cannot be controlled, and I hope that we will win this political confrontation. Something might come out of it. In the best case, from this resistance, some kind of American left could be reborn, which is not "hashish" and is not Hillary Clinton. Otherwise, great damage will be done. Trump will do great damage to America. The question is whether, at the end of that process, it can be repaired or the damage will continue.
What new things are you preparing, what books are you writing? - Well, we could have a separate interview on that alone (laughs). I'm writing four books at the same time, and I'm writing articles about Trump that I haven't started publishing yet. I teach creative writing at two places and write daily in my office, where I call myself a "protected witness." Here, I will reveal to you, one book is a novel that begins in Sarajevo in 1914, when the First World War began, and ends sometime in 1949 in Shanghai. The second book is about my parents, who live there, nearby, in Canada, although they spend one spring and summer in Sarajevo every year—how they look at the world around us. I am still writing a book dedicated to the Bosnia and Herzegovina. diaspora in America with the working title "Where am I from here?" and another book of my notes and impressions. I manage to write about 1,500 words every day. When other people around are a disaster, my adrenaline kicks in, and I then intensify my writing.